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Abstract 
This paper looks at the measures taken by East 
Asian countries since the 1997-8 crisis to reduce the 
odds of a new crisis. It finds that odds are low, but 
far from zero. Much progress has been done to deal 
with the vulnerabilities that have been identified so 
far, but some remain. The massive accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves is raising the threshold at 
which markets would trigger speculative attacks, 
but the threshold is still well within reach of 
international markets. Efforts at building a regional 
defense system are slow and unlikely to come to 
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1.  Introduction 
Almost a decade after East Asia underwent its financial crisis, the scars have not 
healed. Growth is often significantly lower than it used to be, most countries are 
still accumulating massive stocks of foreign exchange reserves and discussions 
continue to build up collective defense mechanisms. The fear that a crisis could hit 
again is clearly prevalent throughout the region. Crises can never be ruled out, of 
course, nor can they often be predicted. Yet, are East Asian countries vulnerable to 
yet another crisis?  
 
The 1997-98 crisis has been spectacular in many respects. It slowly moved from 
one country to another. It affected the most economically successful countries at the 
time. With the possible exception of Thailand, standard vulnerability indicators 
were not sending any warning signals. Indeed, the Asian crisis led to the 
development of a third generation of self-fulfilling currency crisis models (Chang 
and Velasco, 1999; Krugman, 1999). It was followed by highly contentious IMF 
programs that were larger and more intrusive than ever before (Radelet and Sachs, 
1998; Feldstein (1998), De Gregorio et al., 1999), leading to calls for adjustment 
(Feldstein, 1998; Williamson, 2001) that were eventually heeded (Independent 
Evaluation Office, 2003).  
 
The crisis also hit countries that were not historically crisis-prone, as Table 11.1. 
shows. The table measures the incidence of currency crises, using data available on 
Michael Bordo’s website. For each country, incidence is calculated as the number 
of crises observed – using an exchange market pressure index – during the sample 
period divided by the number of years of observation. The regional incidence index 
is the unweighted average of national incidence indices. The regions are ranked 
from the least to the most crisis-prone. East Asia stands out as the least crisis-prone, 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for the conference “China and Emerging Asia: Reorganizing the Global Economy?” 
to be held on May 11-12, 2006 in Seoul. I am grateful to Yung Chul Park for asking the question in 
the paper’s title as well as for many enlightening discussions of the Asian crisis.   2
by far. Removing the fateful year 1997 would drive the incidence index for East 
Asia much further down.  
 
[TABLE 11.1. ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
This paper examines whether East Asia remains vulnerable to financial crises. To 
start with, Section 2 reminds us that this question would have received a negative 
answer even as late as in 1996. Then Section 3 describes how the East Asian 
countries have endeavored since 1998 to protect themselves from a re-run of the 
traumatic events that are still haunting them. In particular, it argues that the 
spectacular build-up of foreign exchange reserves reduces, but does not eliminate, 
the odds of a crisis. Based on the three generations of crisis models, Section 4 seeks 
to identify the remaining vulnerabilities. The last section wraps up the previous 
conclusions and examines the policy options.  
 
 
2.  Was the 1997 Crisis Special? 
The Asian crisis took most observers by surprise. This is documented in  
 
Table 11.2., which lists various crisis indicators as available in 1996. The first two 
columns display the probability of a crisis – defined as a change in an exchange 
market pressure index in excess of three standard deviations – occurring over the 
following two years, as estimated by two risk assessment models developed at the 
IMF. The first index, KLR, is based on Kaminsky et al. (1998), weighs a wide 
range of crisis indicators according to their signal-to-noise performance. The second 
index, DCSD, is based on Berg and Patillo (1999), which uses a probit analysis. 
The crisis probabilities are not negligible, especially those produced by the DCSD 
indicator. Note, however, that the two sets of risk assessment differ markedly from 
country to country. For instance, DCSD was issuing concerned signals for Taiwan, 
Thailand and Malaysia while KLR put much lower probabilities for these countries, 
worrying instead about the Philippines.  
 
[TABLE 11.2. ABOUT HERE] 
 
How did markets react to these contradictory signals? The last three columns 
indicate that they were not particularly concerned. The third column reports spread 
on local dollar-denominated government bonds (the maturity is not reported). The 
spreads are well within the normal range of emerging market bond spreads. The 
fourth column shows average ratings of two agencies, ranging from 0 (no risk) to 
100 (extreme risk). The last column indicates the probability of a 20% real 
devaluation as estimated by The Economist Intelligence Unit. Given that nominal 
depreciation rates over 1997-8 ranged from a minimum of 62% (Philippines) to 
more than 500% (Indonesia), the markets profoundly underestimated what was to 
happen. Note that exchange rate pressure on the Thai baht started to rise in 1996.  3
 
Why then did the crises come as a surprise? The traditional macroeconomic 
indicators were not suggesting any cause for concern, as Table 11.3. shows. 
Inflation was high relatively to the US but generally not different from what it had 
been in the past. Budgets were in slight surplus. Current accounts were in deficit, 
especially so in Thailand, but they were easily financed by capital inflows. Growth 
was high, a continuation of the rates observed over the previous decade, which had 
earned East Asian countries the nickname of economic dragons.  
 
[TABLE 11.3. ABOUT HERE] 
 
Of course, after the crisis, it transpired that the capital accounts were leading to 
dangerous open positions in foreign currencies. Few observers had noticed this 
situation and, indeed, the third generation of currency crisis models were invented 
in response to this realization. It may well be that some astute observers had 
signaled the looming danger, but they were not heard in Washington, Wall Street or 
the City.  
 
Unpredictability does not mean that the crisis was unjustified, though. It may be 
that those who try to predict crises look at the wrong indicators. This is, indeed, the 
sense in which the Asian crisis was special. Yet, previously already, large open 
currency positions had represented a lethal vulnerability; it happened in Chile in 
1983 as documented in De Gregorio et al. (1999), but the lessons had not been 
adequately taken on board.  
 
In the end, the crisis has taught us many lessons.
2 First, apparently minor 
vulnerabilities can in no time turn into a major source of concern and eventually 
trigger financial crises. Second, financial liberalization does not mix well with 
rigidly fixed exchange rates; this conclusion has led to the two-corner strategy, 
according to which the only stable foreign exchange regimes are very hard pegs or 
freely floating rates. Third, even when there exist restrictions to capital mobility, the 
currency composition of assets and liabilities matters a great deal. Fourth, contagion 
is a very serious issue, which points to financial market imperfections. Finally, 
predicting financial crises is a daunting undertaking. Some crises – first generation 
crises, created by macroeconomic imbalances – can be foreseen if not dated ex ante; 
other crises – those that occur because underlying vulnerabilities may emerge as a 
cause of concern in financial markets – may or may not happen; we know those that 
occurred but how many more could have occurred and did not?  
 
 
3.  Crisis Prevention in East Asia 
Even though they quickly recovered from the crisis, East Asian countries have 
dedicated massive efforts to avoid the recurrence of such a traumatic event (Park, 
                                                 
2 See, among many others, Eichengreen and Bordo (2001), Frankel (1999), Park and Song (1999), 
Rodrik (1998), Wyplosz (2002) and Independent Evaluation Office (2003).   4
2001). Although the measures taken very significantly differ from one country to 
another, a number of common features emerge. They are briefly reviewed.  
3.1.  Structural reforms 
The crisis revealed that a number of economic and political arrangements, which 
had been previously seen as key factors in the highly successful catch-up phase of 
the two preceding decades, turned out to be vulnerabilities. The general reason is 
that East Asia’s strategy of trade and financial integration rested to a significant 
degree on an alliance between governments, banks and large corporations. Early on, 
this alliance allowed for the mobilization of resources and provided support to 
dynamic entrepreneurs, both domestically and for trade promotion. Over time, the 
growing size of these companies, along with their integration into the world 
economy, made them more vulnerable to reversals of fortune. Guaranteed state and 
banking support had a deleterious effect, though. It made these companies less alert 
to the risks that they were taking. It also proved insufficient when the tide 
unexpectedly reversed; by then, the companies were too big for bail-outs and yet 
too big to fail.  
 
Under pressure from creditors and the IMF, corporate restructuring was undertaken 
in the midst of the crisis. It included a deep overhaul of the banking system that was 
in effect bankrupt. The costs were huge but, as the contrast with Japan’s lost decade 
shows, it contributed to a quick resumption of growth, although at a slower pace 
than before. As growth resumed, though, the appetite for restructuring declined and 
external pressure could be resisted. The restructuring process then slowed down, it 
often even stopped. The links between government, banks and large corporations 
has been lessened but it still survives in a number of countries. An indirect 
indication of this evolution is the size of stock markets, as measured by 
capitalization. Table 11.4. shows that, ignoring the special cases of Singapore and 
Hong Kong, stock markets are somewhat undersized in most Asian countries.  
 
[TABLE 11.4. ABOUT HERE] 
3.2.  Exchange Rate Regimes 
A key conclusion from the crisis was that exchange rate pegging is dangerous when 
capital controls are removed. By the time they were hit, many East Asian countries 
had maintained some limited restrictions on capital movement, but these controls 
were too light to provide effective protection, except for China whose currency is 
non-convertible and Malaysia, which reintroduced capital controls. In the aftermath 
of the crisis, under pressure from the IMF, the process of financial integration 
accelerated. Full capital mobility is not complete everywhere, yet, but is generally 
high.  
 
Under these conditions, a high degree of exchange rate flexibility is required in 
order to reduce the risk of currency crises. A classification of exchange rate regimes  5
is presented in Figure 11.1. .
 3 According to this classification Malaysia and the 
Philippines were de facto floating in 1995, the year before the crisis, but they 
tightened their regimes in 1996. The other crisis countries were operating a mixed 
regime (Indonesia and Thailand) or moving to fixity (Korea). Since the crisis, 
formally or informally, most of the East Asian countries have adopted a basket – 
mostly including the dollar, the euro and the yen, some include the renminbi – to 
which they more or less loosely peg their currencies. Yet, the figure suggests that 
the currencies of Indonesia and Thailand are de facto floating, while the other three 
countries have moved toward more fixity.
4  
 
For countries that have expressed fear of crisis, the prevalence of pegs, even quite 
soft, may be surprising. One interpretation is that free floating clashes with the 
export-led strategy that has long prevailed in the region. With export 
competitiveness at the heart of their growth strategy, the East Asian countries also 
exhibit fear of overvaluation. The trade-off between these two fears has been 
sharpened by the emergence of China as a regional economic power. One response 
has been to implicitly tie the currencies to the renminbi or to otherwise stabilize the 
effective nominal or real exchange rates. The growing role of basket pegs, 
advocated by Williamson (1999), is a manifestation of fear of overvaluation. Even 
if China were to move toward exchange rate flexibility, the other Asian countries 
are likely to continue keeping a close eye on their renminbi exchange rates.  
 
[FIGURE 11.1. ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.3.  Foreign exchange rate accumulation 
Having rejected the free float option, the East Asian countries have turned to 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation to reduce the risk of speculative attacks. 
The reserves build-up can also be seen in the context of another legacy from the 
1997-8 crisis, fear of IMF. To varying degrees, all countries share the view that the 
IMF conditions, imposed at the apex of the crisis, were ill-designed and excessively 
coercitive. As noted above, there is much ex post agreement, including at the IMF, 
that the same conditions would not be applied in a re-run of the crisis. Still, the East 
Asian countries are unwilling to test that hypothesis and are determined to avoid 
calling up the IMF again in the event of financial market turbulence. Foreign 
exchange reserves, even if they are costly to accumulate and hold, are seen as an 
insurance against such a risk.  
 
The impressive reserves buildup in six Asian countries is shown in Figure 11.2. . 
The data refer to gross reserves, ignoring gross liabilities, which explains the 
                                                 
3 This is a de facto interpretation of the exchange regime, as opposed to the de jure regime reported 
to the IMF. For a detailed explanation, see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). For an alternative 
classification, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  
4 More recently, Korea has reestablished a fair degree of flexibility, although it remains to be seen 
how this will translate into de facto behavior.   6
apparent stability of the stock of international assets at the time of the crisis in all 
countries except Indonesia and Thailand. This means that the accumulation of net 
reserves has been even faster since the crisis.  
 
[FIGURE 11.2. ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 11.5. further documents the process by looking at the ratio of reserves to 
GDP and by showing the ranking among all IMF member countries. In absolute 
terms, China is the largest world holder of gross reserves; as a percentage of GDP, 
Singapore tops the world league, just ahead of Hong Kong. On either measure, all 




The costs of investing such large amounts of wealth in presumably low-yielding 
assets – little is known about portfolio management in most countries – are 
significant. As noted above, these costs can be seen as an insurance premium, but is 
the insurance likely to deliver? An indication is the case of Thailand. Before the 
crisis, it ranked 15
th in terms of the reserves to GDP ratio and 13
th in absolute size 
of its gross reserves stock. It run down 43% of its stock during the crisis and yet 
could not avoid a deep devaluation. Would its current stock, 50% larger than in 
1995, do a better job should speculation hit again?  
 
In fact, no matter how large they are, reserve stocks do not provide a fool-proof 
guarantee that speculative attacks can be beaten back. The following simple model, 
borrowed from Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003), explains why. It portrays four types of 
agents: a domestic central bank, domestic private banks, bank depositors and 
international investors. Bank deposits are liquid in the sense that they can be 
withdrawn in period 1, the short run, while long term assets are held for the long 
run, i.e. period 2. The model creates both a liquidity and a currency mismatch in the 
banks balance sheets by assuming that the only bank liabilities are liquid deposits 
D* in dollars, while bank assets A are in long-term bonds denominated in the local 
currency, say the won. In order to pay back depositors who wish to withdraw their 
funds in period 1, banks must sell their won bonds in exchange for dollars.  
 
This double mismatch is introduced to create the possibility that a bank run can 
occur under some conditions. We assume that all banks are identical; consequently, 
depositors run on the whole banking sector or do not run at all. Let P* be the dollar 
price in period 1 of a won bond due to mature in period 2. If i is the nominal won 
interest rate and S1 is the won/dollar exchange rate, P*=1/[(1+i)S1]. With these 
definitions, a bank run occurs when P
*A < D
*. In such an event, we assume that the 
banks sell their won bonds for dollars, and then they collapse. On the contrary, there 
is no run if P
*A ≥ D
*  and we safely move to period 2.  
 
In addition to banks and depositors, we consider N identical investors endowed with 
W1
* dollars at the beginning of period 1. They decide whether to invest in dollar or  7
in won-denominated bonds. If they invest B in won-denominated bonds and W1*-
(B/S1) in dollar-denominated bonds, their wealth in period 2 will be W2* = 
(1+i*)W1* + ρ(B/S1), where  
ρ = i - i*- (s2-s1) is the excess return on won bonds, and st = ln(St) is the log 
deviation of he exchange rate from an arbitrary base level S. Note that investors can 
hold short won positions i.e. B can negative. If each investor maximizes a mean-
variance utility function such as U = E(W2*) - (a/2) Var(W2*), where a is a measure 
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We now consider the central bank’s policy. The bank enters period 1 with a stock 
R0
* of foreign exchange reserves in dollars.  In period 1, the balance-of-payments 
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where R* is the end-of-period 1 stock of foreign exchange reserves, CA is the 
period 1 current account (taken to be exogenous) and δ is a bank run indicator: δ = 
1 indicates a bank run and δ = 0 no bank run, for reasons explained shortly. The 
bank decides on i and s1 under the constraint that R* ≥ 0, in order to keep the 
exchange rate fixed.  Its preferences are presumed to be lexicographic. Its priority is 
to avoid a bank run; when this is achieved, it sets the interest rate and the exchange 
rate so as to maximize its other objectives.
5 This priority can be expressed as: 
 
R* ≥  0 and P*A ≥ D*                
(3) 
 
However, if a bank run occurs, the central bank is assumed to be committed to 
support the banking system by selling its reserves in order to provide the dollars 
needed to pay back the depositors. Thus, in the event of a bank run, the central bank 
sells to its banks an amount P
*A of its reserves.  
 
Finally, we assume that the second period exchange rate S2 depends on whether or 
not the banking sector has collapsed in period 1. Other things equal, a banking 
collapse tends to depreciate the domestic currency, which is exogenously set to be 
equal d if the banking system has collapsed in period 1, and to 0 if not.  
 
The central bank’s problem is captured by (3). The central bank can always reduce 
the threat of a bank run by raising P*=1/[(1+i)S1], i.e. by lowering the interest rate 
                                                 
5 The central bank can decide on both i and s1 because interest rate parity does not hold, a 
consequence of investors’ risk aversion.   8
or appreciating the exchange rate. But, in doing so, the central bank reduces the 
demand for domestic bonds, as (1) shows, and therefore its stock of foreign 
exchange reserves R*, see (2). Thus it is possible for the two objectives in (3) to be 
mutually inconsistent.  
 
The Appendix shows that if R0* > R0*
sup the central bank will set i + s1 ≤  x  and 
avoid a bank run. If R0* < R0*
inf, there is a bank run and the central bank runs out of 
reserves, hence a currency collapse follows. For R0
*inf ≤ R0* ≤ R0
*sup, we have a 
situation of multiple equilibria, with or without a bank run, depending on whether 
or not depositors coordinate on a run. The thresholds x, R0
*inf and R0
*sup are shown 
in the Appendix.  
 
This is nothing else than the familiar case of multiple bank-run equilibria (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983) in an international setting. It carries three important 
implications. First, the stock of reserves does matter. Indeed, if R0*> R0*
sup a bank 
run and currency collapse can be ruled out. The knowledge that the central bank has 
enough resources to thwart a bank run is enough to reassure domestic depositors 
and international investors and prevent a speculative attack.  
 
Second, what matters is the initial stock of reserves R0*, not the reserves being 
accumulated. Once depositors and international investors become suspicious, the 
central bank does not have any good option left. If it tries to solve the banking 
problem it creates an exchange rate problem, and conversely. This would seem to 
vindicate the strategy of the East Asian central banks.  
 
Third, the question is how big is R0*
sup? Obviously, this stylized model cannot 
provide a reliable guide to answer that question, but one observation is important. 
When risk aversion becomes very low, i.e. when a becomes arbitrarily small and 
domestic and foreign bonds become close substitutes,
6 (3) implies that both R0*
inf 
and R0*
sup become arbitrarily large. In that case, the required amount of 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves is virtually unbounded. This latter result 
indicates that there is no guarantee that the strategy of the East Asian central banks 
provides an iron-clad insurance. In particular, the deepening financial integration of 
East Asia into world markets can be seen as raising the thresholds.  
 
The interpretation of this latter conclusion is clear. As a central bank intervenes on 
the foreign exchange market and sells its reserves, international investors – who can 
be home-based – interpret the depleting reserve stock as a signal of growing 
vulnerability. Consequently they take increasingly large negative open positions in 
domestic bonds – B becomes negative – which, according to (2) accelerates the loss 
of reserves in an ever-deepening vicious circle. It is not just the assets of the 
banking system – δP*A* in (2) with δ=1 – that the central bank must underwrite, 
but the whole amount of potential speculative capital. Given the size of 
international financial markets, the situation can quickly become desperate. Even an 
                                                 
6 Note that (1) implies that expected excess returns E(ρ) become arbitrarily small.   9
IMF rescue may prove insufficient, as the 1997-98 crisis made abundantly clear. 
Put differently and starkly, the view that East Asian countries are now immune to 
speculative attacks thanks to their asset stocks is illusory. No matter how much they 
accumulate, they remain vulnerable.  
3.4.  Monetary Cooperation 
Ever since the project of an Asian Monetary Fund was strongly opposed from 
outside in the midst of the crisis, the East Asian countries have sought to strengthen 
monetary cooperation. The 2000 Chiang Mai initiative has allowed the pooling of 
$35.5 billion of foreign exchange reserves, in line with the reserve accumulation 
process. The 2003 Asian Bond Market (ABM) initiative aims at developing a 
regional market for Asian currency bonds. Recently, the Asian Development Bank 
has proposed the creation of an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) that would underpin 
the ABM project.  
 
The striking feature of these efforts is that they stay well short of effective monetary 
cooperation. Each country seems to regard the others as competitors as much as 
partners. This is in line with the growth-led strategy and its emphasis on using the 
exchange rate as a key development tool. In effect, as previously noted, the 
adoption, formal or informal, of currency basket targeting is an efficient way of 
guaranteeing that regional bilateral exchange rates remain stable. Mimicry seems to 
deliver most of what Asian countries wish. Unsurprisingly the appetite for deeper 
cooperation, which would require some loss of sovereignty, is highly limited.  
 
What mimicry does not deliver, though, is a protection against currency and 
financial crises. An implication of Section 3.3 is that reserve pooling can help but 
not eliminate the risk of crisis. The ABM initiative may eventually contribute to 
boosting resilience to shocks. The ACU proposal is not adding much to the existing 
web of baskets
7 unless it is a step towards a European-style Exchange Rate 
Mechanism on the way to a monetary union. Deep political differences preclude 
such an evolution in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in spite of countless conferences 
and statements, the Asian countries have never created the kind of supranational 
institution that could embody a deep cooperation process and receive whatever 
elements of national sovereignty countries are willing to forego.  
 
 
4.  How Vulnerable Are the Asian Countries? 
In order to examine the potential vulnerabilities of the Asian countries, this section 
follows the logic of the exchange crisis literature, distinguishing among the three 
generations of models. 
                                                 
7 Park and Wyplosz (2004) show that the precise definition of these baskets makes no significant 
difference.   10
4.1.  First Generation: Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities 
The first generation of exchange crisis models deals with crises that are caused by 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities and are therefore predictable, for example in Russia 
in 1998 and in Argentina in 2001. Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) 
emphasize budget deficits that must eventually be money-financed, but a broader 
array of factors would also include monetary policy indiscipline, overvalued 
exchange rates and contagion from crises in important trading partners.  
 
The East Asian countries are known for their prudent macroeconomic policies. 
As Table 11.3. shows, macroeconomic factors generally did not play a major 
role in the 1997-98 crisis; this is indeed why these crises were not predicted.  
 
Table 11.6. shows that the situation remains broadly similar in 2005, except that the 
current account deficits observed in 1996 have been replaced by surplus while, on 
the other hand, most countries now exhibit negative budget balances, a mild source 
of concern.  
 
[TABLE 11.6. ABOUT HERE] 
4.2.  Second Generation: Non Financial Vulnerabilities 
The second generation models emphasize non-financial conditions that may 
abruptly sour in a way that becomes unmanageable by the authorities. Obstfeld 
(1986) has shown how crises can be self-fulfilling in such a situation. If, facing a 
speculative attack, the authorities are unable to adopt defensive measures, such as 
raising the interest rate or tightening fiscal policy, two outcomes are possible. If the 
markets believe that a crisis is likely, they will attack the currency and will be 
vindicated by the authorities’ inability to react. On the other hand, if the markets are 
not particularly concerned, the situation may gradually improve without any crisis.  
 
There is no standard list of potential culprits in this case. Large public debts, low 
growth and high unemployment rates are believed to have played a role in Europe 
and Argentina, for instance. Political weakness may also prevent governments from 
displaying firmness when and if needed. The diffuse and imprecise description of 
what may be a vulnerability means that it is practically to evaluate this source of 
crisis. One can note that some Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia, Thailand) exhibit 
relatively large external debts.
8    
4.3.  Third Generation: Financial Vulnerabilities 
The third generation interpretation, developed in the wake of the Asian crisis, is a 
variant of the second one. Third generation crises are also of the self-fulfilling 
variety. What distinguishes them is that the vulnerabilities – which may or may not 
provoke a crisis – originate in the financial sector. At the root of financial 
                                                 
8 When is “large” too large ? For an attempt to deal with this question, see Reinhart et al. (2003).   11
vulnerabilities are mismatches between assets and liabilities, whether they are held 
by financial institutions or by the non-financial sector, and whether they concern the 
public or the private sectors. Mismatches may refer to the currency composition or 
to the maturity structure or assets and liabilities.  
 
Evidence on both kinds of mismatches is preliminary for lack of adequate data 
collection. Some aggregate data is produced by the BIS but it conceals many crucial 
details. Bleakley and Cowan (2003) provide measures of maturity mismatch in non-
financial corporations for a number of emerging market countries, including the 
crisis countries of East Asia. Although they cover mostly the 1990s, their 
conclusion is that maturity mismatch is not significant. Whether this conclusion 
applies to the financial and public sectors is apparently not known. Certainly, large 
public debts can be seen as source of maturity mismatch.  
 
Goldstein and Turner (2004) focus their attention on currency mismatch to produce 
a synthetic indicator of currency mismatch. This indicator, shown in Figure 11.3. 
for the pre-crisis year (1995) and for the latest available year (2002), is negative 
when the country has a short foreign currency position and it is scaled by the share 
of foreign currency debt in total debt. Brazil is added as a comparator. Except for 
Indonesia and Thailand, the currency mismatch, as reported by this indicator, was 
negligible (Korea) or inexistent.
9 The figure shows that the situation as of 2002 has 
further improved throughout the region, with exception of the Philippines. 
Inasmuch as this indicator is reliable, currency mismatch is not a major source of 
vulnerability.  
 
[FIGURE 11.3. ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.  Conclusions: Unanswerable Questions and Policy Implications 
By way of conclusion, this section starts by asking the questions that we would like 
to answer but that we really cannot with any degree of certainty. It then goes on 
raising some policy issues that cannot either be entirely conclusive. The sad truth is 
that, in spite of years of active and innovative research and of the gradual 
production of new data sets, we still know much too little. Maybe the more 
depressing conclusion is that each major crisis provides us with new insights so that 
we will need many more crises to be able to provide firmer answers to vitally 
important questions. Economics is not an experimental science, yet we learn mostly 
through experiments.  
 
Question 1: Is East Asia safe from financial crises? A rigorous answer must be 
negative. No country that, in one way or another, pegs its exchange rate is ever safe. 
Accidents happen and, when compounded with pre-existing vulnerabilities, they 
can suddenly and radically alter the economic situation. This is, after all, one lesson 
from the Asian crisis.  
 
                                                 
9 As it adds the currency position of banks and non-banks the indicator can hide sectoral mismatches.   12
Question 2: Is a financial crisis in Asia likely in the coming years? Generally, the 
likelihood of a major crisis is low, but it is far from zero. Much progress has been 
done to deal with the vulnerabilities that have been identified so far, but 
vulnerabilities – some of which may not have been identified yet – remain. The 
massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is raising the threshold at which 
markets would trigger speculative attacks, but the threshold is still well within reach 
of international markets.  
 
Question 3: Would letting the exchange rate freely float remove the specter of a 
financial crisis? Exchange rate targets, whether fixed or fuzzy, and whether 
officially announced or not, offer themselves to speculative pressure. Removing this 
magnet is a significant step towards lessening the risk of a crisis. Yet, in the end, 
there is little difference between a collapsing pegged exchange rate system and a 
freely falling currency.  
 
Because so many vulnerabilities exist, many of which may have not yet have been 
identified as such, most countries face the risk of self-fulfilling attacks. This is one 
reason behind the popularity of the two-corner strategy. It does not mean, though, 
that all countries should adopt corner exchange rate regimes. The argument in favor 
of corner strategies must be balanced against other arguments. The Asian countries 
have generally decided to remain “in the middle” for reasons associated to their 
development strategies. Explicitly or not, they have decided to trade off the benefits 
from an export-led strategy, based on exchange rate stability and external 
competitiveness, against the probability of renewed speculative attacks. If the 
probability is low enough, which we do not know, the choice is reasonable.  
 
Accumulating foreign exchange reserves is one way of bringing the probability 
down. As noted in Section 3.3, it can work although it would be wrong to assume 
that very large reserve stocks fully eliminate the threat of successful attacks. It is 
easy to imagine how a domestic financial accident or serious political turmoil could 
precipitate a currency crisis. One vulnerability of the current situation is that several 
countries seem to believe that they are now protected from a currency crisis. It 
would be sad that such a misguided perception acts as a disincentive to continue 
removing existing vulnerabilities.  
 
Should a crisis occur, it need not be devastating. One lesson from financial turmoil 
in the developed countries – the European currency crisis of 1992-93, the sharp fall 
of the Nasdaq in 2000 – is that economies can be made resilient. This is not the 
place to develop the measures that bring about resilience to financial turmoil; 
suffice it to note that adequate financial market regulation, labor market flexibility 
and, of course, a healthy macroeconomic situation, all contribute to alleviate and 
abbreviate the impact of a financial crisis.  
 
A general vulnerability to financial crises is part and parcel of the process of 
liberalization and integration into world markets. It is usually considered that this 
process is a positive one, at least in the long run. Yet, in the shorter run, it tends to  13
be associated with crises that foster deep recessions. Does that mean that financial 
liberalization should be resisted? The logical answer has to be negative on the 
ground that permanent gains eventually outweigh temporary costs.
10 Yet, the 
mounting evidence that financial liberalization only enhances growth for countries 
that have reached a sufficient degree of development
11 suggests that delaying this 
step may bring about gain without pain.  
 
Finally, the East Asian countries have sought to strengthen monetary cooperation, 
partly to forge a common defense mechanism against speculative attacks. Recent 
initiatives have gone further than symbolism but remain well short of an 
arrangement that would indeed make a significant contribution. At this stage, 
repelling speculative attacks remains largely a national responsibility.  
                                                 
10 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that financial liberalization is the most reliable predictor of 
twin (currency and banking) crises while Wyplosz (2002) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) 
identify systematic boom and bust cycles in the aftermath of financial liberalization. Taking into 
account the occurrence of crises, Tornell et al. (2004) conclude in favor of financial liberalization, in 
contrast with Rodrik (1998).   
11 See Edwards (2001) and Kose et al. (2005).   14
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0.0802 0.1019 0.1025 0.1225 0.1481 0.1766  
 
Source: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/ 
Notes: The sample period is either 1880-1997 or 1971-1997 and it includes 56 countries. “Others” 
includes: Australia, Canada, Egypt, Israel, New Zealand, Turkey, and the USA.  
 
 
Table 11.2. Crisis Risk Assessments in 1996  
 
Source: Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo (2005) 
Notes: Based on KLR, DCSD, Bond Spread, Credit Rating, and the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) forecasts.  
1Countries that suffered a crisis in 1997 are in bold. The countries are ordered by severity of crisis.  
2Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon, from average KLR model for 1996. 
3Probabilities of currency crisis over a 24-month horizon, from average of 1996 DCSD results. 
4The spread is expressed in basis points. It refers to the difference between the yield on U.S. dollar–
denominated foreign government eurobonds and the equivalent maturity U.S. treasury bonds. 
5Average of S&P and Moody’s ratings, each converted to a numerical rating ranging from 100 (S&P 
SD) to 0 (S&P AAA or Moody’s Aaa). A lower number means a better rating. 
6 Currency risk: “Scores and ratings assess the risk of a devaluation against the dollar of 20 percent 
or more in real terms over the two-year forecast period,” following EIU. 
 
Table 11.3. Macroeconomic indicators (1996) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Inflation 8.0 4.9 3.5 7.5 5.8
Budget balance 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.9
Growth rate 7.8 7.0 10.0 5.8 5.9
Current account  -3.4 -4.2 -4.4 -4.8 -8.1
Overal balance of payments 2.0 0.3 2.5 5.2 1.2  
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Note: Budget balance, current account and overall balance of payments as percent of GDP. 
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Table 11.4. Stock Market Capitalization (2004) 
Rank Country US$ millions Rank Country Percent GDP
1 United States 16,323,509        1 Hong Kong 519.8
2 Japan 5,844,722          2 Switzerland 230.3
3 United Kingdom 2,865,243          3 South Africa 206.1
4 Euronext 2,441,261          4 Singapore 202.4
5 Germany 1,194,517          5 Luxembourg 158.3
6 Canada 1,177,518          6 Malaysia 153.5
7 Spain 940,673             7 Taiwan 145.6
8 Hong Kong 861,463             8 United States 139.1
9 Switzerland 826,041             9 United Kingdom 134.3
10 Italy 789,563             10 Japan 125.2
11 Australia 776,403             11 Chile 124.2
12 China 447,720             12 Australia 122.1
13 South Africa 442,526             13 Canada 118.7
14 Taiwan 441,436             14 Sweden 107.6
15 Korea 389,473             15 Finland 99.6
16 Sweden 376,781             16 Spain 95.4
17 India 363,276             17 Euronext 78.8
18 Brazil 330,347             18 Israel 77.1
19 Singapore 217,618             19 Thailand 71.4
20 Finland 183,765             20 Denmark 63.7
21 Malaysia 181,624             21 Ireland 63.2
22 Mexico 171,940             22 Greece 59.8
23 Denmark 155,233             23 Korea 57.3
24 Norway 141,624             24 Norway 55.8
25 Greece 121,921             25 Brazil 54.7
26 Chile 116,924             26 Malta 53.5
27 Thailand 115,390             27 India 53.0
28 Ireland 114,086             28 Italy 47.4
29 Turkey 98,299              29 New Zealand 44.7
30 Israel 90,158              30 Germany 44.6
31 Austria 87,776              31 Philippines 33.2
32 Indonesia 73,251              32 Turkey 32.5
33 Poland 71,547              33 Austria 30.2
34 Luxembourg 50,144              34 Hungary 28.4
35 New Zealand 43,731              35 Indonesia 28.4
36 Argentina 40,594              36 Poland 28.4
37 Hungary 28,630              37 Argentina 26.5
38 Philippines 28,602              38 China 26.0
39 Colombia 25,223              39 Colombia 25.7
40 Sri Lanka 3,657                40 Mexico 25.4
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org/), International Financial 
Statistics and Taiwan Statistics. 
Note: The US figure combines NYSE, Nasdaq and American; The Japanese figure combines Tokyo 
and Osaka.   
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Source: Update of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
Note: 1 = inconclusive; 2 = float; 3 = dirty; 4 = dirty/crawling peg; 5 = fixed.  18
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF and Central Bank of Taiwan.  19
Table 11.5. Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Rank Country Reserves Rank Country Reserves Rank Country Reserves Rank Country Reserves
2 Singapore 82.9 1 Singapore 101.2 4 China 79.86 1 China 567.37
8 Hong Kong 37.7 2 Hong Kong 70.1 5 Singapore 68.67 2 Korea 199.12
12 Malaysia 27.9 4 Malaysia 56.4 9 Hong Kong 48.68 5 Hong Kong 116.19
21 Thailand 21.4 10 China 33.0 13 Thailand 37.32 6 Singapore 108.77
42 Philippines 14.2 12 Thailand 30.4 15 Korea 32.92 10 Malaysia 66.69
44 China 14.0 14 Korea 29.3 16 Malaysia 25.47 13 Thailand 49.23
67 Indonesia 11.4 39 Philippines 18.7 24 Indonesia 19.41 17 Indonesia 38.50
116 Korea 6.3 53 Indonesia 14.9 45 Philippines 7.92 32 Philippines 16.12
Per cent of GDP US $ billions
1995 2004 1995 2004
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
 
Table 11.6. Macroeconomic indicators (2005) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
Inflation 5.9 3.0 2.4 6.5 1.7 3.5
Budget balance -0.8 -2.8 -3.1 -3.6 -4.9 0.0
Growth rate 5.5 4.1 5.7 5.0 4.2 5.6
Current account  2.1 3.9 10.2 3.0 6.8 2.3
Overal balance of payments 0.1 5.7 0.0 -1.8 - 3.5  
Source: Asian Economic Outlook 2005, Asian Development Bank. 
Note: Overall balance of payments are from International Financial Statistics and concern 2004.  20







































































Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004) 












, where NCA is the 
country net foreign currency assets, X and N are exports and imports, respectively, D is the country’s 
external debt and D
$ is foreign currency-denominated debt.  21
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